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DUBIOUS PROTECTED CLASS
DISTINCTIONS: ELIMINATING THE
ROLE OF REPLACEMENT IDENTITY IN A
DISCHARGED TITLE VII PLAINTIFF'S CASE
Abstract: Title VII prohibits employers from discharging an employee
on the basis of the individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. In cases involving an allegation of discriminatory discharge, the
federal circuit courts of appeals have disagreed on whether to consider
in the prima facie case the identity of the person the defendant em-
ployer has hired to replace the plaintiff. The majority of these courts
have held that courts should not require the plaintiff to prove that a
person outside of the plaintiff's protected class replaced the plaintiff in
order to establish a prima facie case for employment discrimination.
This Note argues that, because the underlying policy of Title VII is to
protect individuals, not classes of individuals, from employment discrim-
ination, consideration of replacement identity has no valid place in a
discriminatory discharge case brought under Title VII.
INTRODUCTION
Recognizing the importance and centrality of employment in
Americans' lives and livelihood, Congress passed Title VII as part of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 1 Title VII prohibits employers from fail-
ing or refusing to hire any individual, discharging any employee, or
otherwise discriminating against any individual with respect to com-
pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment on the basis
of the individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 2
A Title VII violation generally falls under one of two categories:
disparate impact. or disparate treatments Disparate impact cases in-
volve claims that an employer's facially neutral policy disproportion-
ately affects employees within a protected group and cannot be
justified by a business necessity. 4 In contrast, disparate treatment
claims allege that the employer has intentionally discriminated
I See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
2 See id.
s See, e.g., Cumpiano v. Banco Santander P.R., 902 F,2d 148, 156 (1st Cir. 1990).
4 See id.
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against individual employees based on race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.5
Disparate treatment cases may be further broken down into cases
that involve failure to hire, discriminatory discharge cases, and cases
that involve the terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. 6
cases involving an allegation of discriminatory discharge, the federal
circuit courts of appeals have disagreed on whether to consider in the
prima facie case the identity of the person the defendant employer
has hired to replace the plaintiff.? Some courts have required the
plaintiff to show that someone who is not a member of the plaintiff's
protected class replaced the plaintiff as an element of the prima facie
case. 6
Thus, in these courts, if the plaintiff is an outspoken Korean-
American woman alleging that her employer discharged her based on
her race, the court may rule against her on a summary judgment mo-
tion if her employer subsequently replaced her with a Japanese-
American employee, because she has failed to establish a required
element of her prima facie case.9 Alternatively, if the same plaintiff
alleged gender discrimination, the employer may escape liability by
hiring a female employee whom it perceived as more demure. 0
Other courts have not strictly required this showing of replace-
ment outside the plaintiff's protected class but have nevertheless con-
sidered the identity of the plaintiff's replacement.n Some courts con-
sider replacement identity to be a factor in the prima facie case while
others consider it in the plaintiff's ultimate burden of persuading the
trier of fact that the employer had a discriminatory purpose in dis-
charging the plaintiff. 12
The majority of the federal circuit courts of appeals have held
that courts should not require the plaintiff to prove that a person out-
side the plaintiff's protected class replaced the plaintiff in order to
5
 See id.
6 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1).
7 Sec Elizabeth Clack-Freeman, Title VII and Plaintiff's Replacement: A Prima Facie Consid-
eration?, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 463, 469 (1998).
See, e.g., Brown v. McLean, 159 F.3d 898, 905 (4th Cir. 1998); Talley v. Bravo Pitino
Rest., Ltd., 61 F.3d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1995).
9
 See Brown, 159 F.3d at 905; Talley, 61 F.3d at 1246.
1 ° See Brown, 159 F.3d at 905; Talley, 61 F.3d at 1246.
11 See, e.g., Walker v. NationsBank of Fla. N.A., 53 F.3d 1548, 1556 n.12 (11th Cir. 1995);
Walker v. St. Anthony's Med. Ctr., 881 F.2d 554, 558 (8th Cir. 1989); Simens v. Reno, 960 F.
Supp. 6, 8, 10 (D.D.C. 1997).
12 See, e.g., Kendrick v. Penske Transport. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1228-29 (10th Cir.
2000); St. Anthonys, 881 F.2d at 558.
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establish a prima facie case for employment. discrimination." This
Note argues that consideration of replacement identity has no valid
place in a discriminatory discharge case brought under Title VII."
Part I of this Note outlines the evidentiary framework and the
elements of the prima facie case that the United States Supreme
Court established for Title VII cases in 1973 in McDonnell Douglas Colp.
v. Green.° Part II discusses the various federal circuit courts' treat-
ments of replacement identity, including those that have imposed a
strict replacement requirement for the plaintiff's prima facie case."
Part II also includes a discussion of the federal circuit courts of ap-
peals that state a replacement requirement but do not treat the issue
as dispositive."
In addition, Part II discusses the federal circuit courts of appeals
that do not strictly require replacement outside the protected class
but make replacement identity a consideration, either as a factor in
the prima facie case or as a factor in the plaintiff's ultimate burden of
persuasion." Finally, this Part discusses the cases in which the federal
circuit courts of appeals have found the replacement requirement to
be inconsistent with the policies and purposes of Title VII because
Title VII seeks to protect individuals, rather than classes of persons,
from employment discrimination."
Part III focuses on the United States Supreme Court's sparse
treatment of the replacement requirement, including its role in the
age discrimination context." Finally, Part IV contends that the same
arguments that support the elimination of the replacement require-
ment in the prima facie case also support its removal from considera-
tion in the plaintiffs ultimate burden of persuasion. 21 This Part also
explores the importance of focusing the debate surrounding the dis-
charged plaintiff's replacement on the ultimate inquiry of discrimina-
13 See, e.g., Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1228-29; Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., Inc., 191 F.3d 344,
353 (3d Cir. 1999); St. Anthony's, 881 F.2d at 558; sec also Clack-Freeman, supra note 7, at
470.
14 See infra notes 184-229 and accompanying text.
13 Sec 411 U.S. 792,802-05 (1973); infra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 32-155 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 52-71 and accompanying text.
113 Sec infra notes 72-105 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 106-155 and accompanying text.
2° See infra notes 156-183 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 184-229 and accompanying text.
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tory motive, as well as the reasons why protected class categories are
misleading from an evidentiary standpoint. 22
I. THE ELEMENTS OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION As SET FORTH IN
MCDONNELL DOUGLAS CORP. V. GREEN
A. Title VII Evidentiary Framework
An employee alleging employer discrimination on an impermis-
sible basis often has no direct evidence to prove it. 23
 Recognizing this
difficulty, in 1973, in McDonnell Douglas Cotp. v. Green, the United
States Supreme Court established a three-step, burden-shifting evi-
dentiary framework for employment discrimination cases brought
under Title V11. 24
First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by showing:
(1) membership in a racial minority; (2) application and qualification
for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) rejection
despite qualifications; and (4) continuation by employer to seek ap-
plicants with similar qualifications after rejecting the plaintiff. 25
Second, if the plaintiff shows all four elements, the burden shifts
to the defendant employer to "articulate some legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason for the employee's rejection.“28 The defendant
need not prove the truth of its claim at this stage; it must merely state
a permissible reason for the plaintiff's rejection or discharge. 27 Third,
once the employer has stated a reason, the burden then shifts back to
the plaintiff to prove that the employer's stated reason is merely a
pretext for its discriminatory motives. 28
B. Title VII Prima Fade Case
In articulating the required elements for the plaintiff's prima fa-
cie case in Title VII disparate treatment cases, the Supreme Court fo-
cused on discriminatory hiring because McDonnell Douglas involved a
22 See infra notes 184-229 and accompanying text.
25 See David G. Harris, Employment Law: O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers
Corp.—Eliminating the Replacement Outside the Protected Class Element in ADEA Hiring and
Replacement Cases, 50 OICI.A. RE v. 282, 289 (1997).
24
 Scc411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973).
25 Id. at 802.
25 Id.
27 See Denny Chin & Jodi Golinsky, Moving Beyond McDonnell Douglas: A Simplified
Method for Assessing Evidence in Discrimination Casa, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 659, 665 (1998).
26 See McDonnel !Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
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black plaintiff whose application for employment was rejected by the
defendant. 29 The Court did not address what is required for cases that
involve discriminatory termination, but most federal circuit courts of
appeals that have addressed the issue of prima facie elements in the
discharge context have adapted the elements set out in McDonnell
Douglas to fit the different factual circumstances." Thus, in these
courts, a prima facie case for a plaintiff alleging discriminatory dis-
charge must show: (1) membership in a protected class; (2)
qualification for the position and satisfaction of its normal require-
ments; (3) the defendant employer discharged the plaintiff; and (4)
after the discharge, the employer sought a replacement with
qualifications similar to those of the plaintiff. 31
II. FEDERAL APPELLATE COURTS' TREATMENT OF REPLACEMENT
IDENTITY IN TITLE VII DISCRIMINATORY DISCHARGE SUITS
In place of the fourth requirement adapted from the 1973
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green prima facie elements, some courts
require the plaintiff to show that the defendant replaced the plaintiff
with someone outside of the plaintiff's protected class." The fourth
requirement of the prima facie case in discriminatory discharge cases
has been the source of much disagreement among the circuits and
has led to infra-circuit inconsistencies as wel1.33 One likely cause for
this confusion and disagreement is footnote thirteen of McDonnell
Douglas, in which the United States Supreme Court qualified the ele-
ments of the prima facie case by stating, "The facts necessarily will
vary in Title VII cases, and the specification above of the prima facie
proof required from [plaintiff] is not necessarily applicable in every
respect to differing factual situations." 34 As a result of the wide lad-
tude the Supreme Court gave the lower courts, the fourth require-
29 See id. at 794, 802.
" See, e.g., Williams v. Ford Motor Co., 19 F.3d 1305, 1308 (8th Cir. 1994); Cumpiano v.
Banco Santander P.R., 902 F.2d 148, 153 (1st Cir. 1990).
31 See, e.g„ Williams, 14 F.3d at 1308; Cumpiana, 902 F.2d at 153.
32 See, e.g., Brown v. McLean, 159 F.3d 898, 905 (4th Cir. 1998); Talley v. Bravo Pitino
Rest., Ltd., 61 F.3d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1995); Walker v. NationsBank of Fla. N.A., 53 F.3d
1548, 1556 (11th Cir. 1995); Edwards v. Wallace Cnity. Coll., 49 F.3d 1517, 1521 (11th Cir.
1995).
" See Clack-Freeman, supra note 7, at 965; Christina M. Satinet; A Matter of Class: The
Impact of Brown v. McLean on Employee Discharge Cases, 46 Vim.. L. Rev. 421, 430 (2001).
34 Sec McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.13 (1973).
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ment has taken on a variety of different versions in federal circuit
courts of appeals opinions 35
A. Replacement Requirement: An Element of the Prima Fade Case
A minority of the federal circuit courts of appeals have required
the plaintiff to show replacement by someone outside the plaintiff's
protected class in order to establish a prima facie case. 36 A subset of
these courts provide an alternative showing to the replacement re-
quirement that would satisfy the fourth element. 37
In 1998, in Brown v. McLean, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit held that a male plaintiff alleging sex discrimi-
nation could not make out a prima facie case of discriminatory ter-
mination because a man replaced him." Brown involved a male city
employee whose position, Administrator of Telephone Facilities, was
eliminated pursuant to recommendations that his new supervisor (a
woman) and her transition team made to the city council." The rec-
ommendations suggested the addition of a new position, Director of
Communications Services, that would include duties held by the
plaintiff. 40 A man was provisionally appointed to this position and be-
gan working in the plaintiff's old office."
In affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment
against the plaintiff, the appellate court stated that a plaintiff alleging
discriminatory discharge must ordinarily show that someone who is
not a member of the same protected class filled the plaintiffs posi-
tion.42
 The court then noted some exceptions to this requirement in
limited situations, including age discrimination cases where a plaintiff
is replaced by a significantly younger person who is also in the pro-
tected class of persons over age forty. 43 Other exceptions included
situations in which there is a significant lapse of time between the
plaintiff's application and the employer's decision to hire another
individual within the same protected class, and where the employer
55 See Clack-Freeman, supra note 7, at 965.
36 See, e.g., Brown, 159 F.3d at 905: Talley, 61 F.3d at 1246.
57 See Talky, 61 F.3d at 1246; Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2c1 577,582-83 (6th Cir.
1992).
"159 F.3d at 905.
59 Id. at 900-01.
40
 Id. at 901.
41 Id,
42 Id. at 905.
45 Brown, 159 F.3d at 905.
2003]	 Title VII Plaintiff s Replacement	 1301
hires another person in the protected class to disguise discrimination
against the plaintiff."
Finding that the plaintiff's case did not fit any of the exceptions,
the court held that he failed to establish a prima facie case. 45 Com-
mentators have criticized the court's decision in Brown, however, for
improper reliance on the "exceptions."" Many courts that have exam-
ined the circumstances or possibilities the Fourth Circuit noted as ex-
ceptions have not characterized them as exceptions, but rather used
them to support the elimination of the replacement requirement. 47
Some courts have provided an alternative to the replacement re-
quirement in the prima facie case by allowing the plaintiff to show
that the employer treated similarly situated employees outside of the
protected class more favorably.° In 1995, in Talley v. Bravo Pitino Res-
taurant, Ltd., the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
examined a case in which the defendant discharged the plaintiff, who
was black, and replaced him with a white person. 4° The plaintiff al-
leged race discrimination and the court held that he satisfied the
fourth prong of the McDonnell Douglas test because he presented evi-
dence that his position was filled by a white person." The court found
that the plaintiff may satisfy the fourth prong of his prima facie case
by showing either that his replacement was outside of the protected
class or that his employer treated similarly situated employees outside
of the protected class more favorably. 51
B. Replacement Requirement: Not Dispositive
Some courts, while stating the replacement requirement as the
fourth prong of the prima facie case, do not strictly apply the re-
quirement.52 For example, in 1995, in Edwards v. Wallace Community
College, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
decided a case in which a subsequently hired black employee assumed
the black plaintiffs duties after her discharge." Although the court
44 Id. at 905-06.
45 Id. at 906.
46 See Sautter, supra note 33, at 446-47.
47 See Howard v. Roadway Express, Inc., 726 F.2d 1529,1535 (11th Cir. 1984); see also
Sautter, supra note 33, at 446-47.
45 See, e.g., Talky, 61 F.3d at 1247; Mitchell, 964 F.2d at 582-83.
45 61 F.3d at 1244.
55 Id. at 1248.
51 Id. at 1247.
" See, e.g., NationsBank, 53 F.3d at 1556 n.12; Edwards, 49 F.3d at 1521.
55 See 49 F.3d at 1521 n.6.
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stated that the plaintiff must satisfy the prima facie element by show-
ing that a non-minority filled her former position, the court acknowl-
edged that a prima facie case is not wholly dependent upon the plain-
tiffs meeting this requirement."
In fact, the court stated that even if the employer had replaced
the plaintiff with a minority employee, the . plaintiff may still establish
a prima facie case.55
 The court found that under these circumstances,
a court must decide whether "the fact that a minority was hired over-
comes the inference of discrimination otherwise created by the evi-
dence presented by the plaintiff."" Some of the factors the court
found important in this determination were similar to the exceptions
the Fourth Circuit noted in Brown: the length of time between the
discharge and replacement; whether the replacement occurred after
the plaintiff filed a complaint; and, if the hired person had a history
with the employer, whether it was a positive one."
Addressing the facts before them, the Eleventh Circuit held that
the black plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case for race dis-
crimination because a subsequently hired black employee assumed
the plaintiff's duties when the employer discharged her and the plain-
tiff failed to present any evidence that the filling of the vacancy by a
minority was pretextual. 58 Thus, the court found that because the
plaintiff did not present evidence that showed the employer used the
hiring of another minority employee to disguise discriminatory in-
tent, she failed to make out a prima facie case."
In 1995, the Eleventh Circuit decided Walker v. NationsBank of
Florida N.A., and again explicitly stated the replacement require-
ment." Finding that the female plaintiff had been replaced by a man,
the court held that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case. 61
Although the fourth element was not at issue in Edwards, the court
noted in a footnote that courts should avoid an overly strict formula-
tion of the prima facie case. 62
 Instead, the better way of making the
prima facie determination was to inquire whether an ordinary person
would reasonably infer discrimination if the facts presented remain
54 See id. at 1521.
55
 See id.
56 Id.
57 See Brown, 159 F.3d at 905-06; Edwards, 49 F.3d at 1521.
"Edwards, 49 F.3d at 1521.
59 Sec id.
60 See 53 F.3d at 1556, 1559.
61 Id. at 1556.
02
 See id. at 1556 n.12.
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unrebuttec1. 65 Thus, although the court stated the requirement in
clear terms, in explaining the requirement, the court characterized it
as a more nebulous "inference of discrimination" finding."
Similarly, in 1997, in Simens v. Reno, the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia stated a replacement requirement
at the outset but later suggested that this element of proof was not
dispositive.65 The plaintiff in Simens was a female special agent for the
Federal Bureau of Investigation who alleged that her employer failed
to promote her because of her gender. 66 The defendant later filled
the position for which the plaintiff applied with another woman. 67
The district court. stated that, to make out a prima facie case, the
plaintiff must show that the defendant employer promoted other em-
ployees who were not members of the protected group at the time it
denied the plaintiff's request for a promotion. 68
Holding that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case,
the district court reasoned that not requiring the plaintiff to make
such a showing regarding her replacement "would give complete
weightlessness to an already light plaintiff's burden."G9 Although ac-
knowledging the possibility that a plaintiff may still create an infer-
ence of discrimination without showing that her replacement was not
a member of her protected class, the district court emphasized that,
in the absence of such a showing, a plaintiff must put forth evidence
of a commensurately forceful nature "to create the same inference of
discrimination that. would arise had the job or the promotion been
given to a man."70 Thus, although the court did not strictly apply the
replacement requirement, it gave much weight to the strength of the
requirement in creating an inference of discrimination."
C. Replacement Identity: A Consideration.
A majority of the federal circuit courts of appeals have held that a
plaintiff claiming discriminatory discharge need not prove that the
plaintiff's employer replaced the plaintiff with someone outside the
63 See id.
64 See id.
66 See 960 F. Supp. 6, 8, 10 (D.D.C. 1997).
66 Id. at 7-8.
07 Id.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 9, 10.
70 Sec Simens, 960 F. Supp. at 10,
71 See id.
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plaintiff's protected class to establish a prima fade case." Many of
these courts, however, state that whether the employer replaces the
plaintiff with someone inside or outside the protected class may be a
factor." Thus, while the fact that the plaintiff's employer replaced the
plaintiff with someone within the same protected class would not be
grounds for dismissing the case, the identity of the plaintiff's re-
placement may serve to weaken or strengthen the inference of dis-
crimination that the plaintiff seeks to establish in a prima facie case. 74
For example, in 1985, in Meiri v. Dacon, the United States Court
of Appeals for the See5nd Circuit explicitly stated that requiring a
plaintiff in a discriminatory discharge case to prove that her employer
hired someone outside her protected class was inappropriate and at
odds with the policies underlying Title VII." The plaintiff in this case
was an Orthodox Jew who alleged that she was discriminatorily dis-
charged based on her religion." Her employer sought a replacement
for her for one year, after which point her duties were assumed by
other employees and her position was ultimately eliminated."
In holding that the replacement requirement was inappropriate
for Title VII prima facie cases, the court reasoned that, often, the
relevant protected class was difficult to identify." Applying this
difficulty to the case before it, the court stated that it was unsure
whether the plaintiff's protected class consisted of those who were
followers of Orthodox Judaism or followers of Judaism generally."
Thus, emphasizing that the "elements of proof in employment dis-
crimination cases were not intended to be 'rigid, mechanized or ritu-
alistic,'" the court held that the fact that someone outside her pro-
tected class did not replace the plaintiff did not prevent her from
showing an inference of discrimination in her prima facie case. 8° Nev-
ertheless, the court suggested that the identity of a plaintiff's re-
placement was a relevant consideration in the prima facie case when it
" See, e.g., Kendrick v. Penske Transport. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1228-29 (10th Cir.
2000); Walker v. St. Anthony's Med. Ctr., 881 F.2d 554, 558 (8th Cir. 1989); sce Clack-
Freeman, supra note 7, at 470.
73 See Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1228-29; St. Anthony's, 881 F.2d at 558.
74 See Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1229 n.8; Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 996 (2d Cir. 1985).
76 See 759 F.2d at 995-96.
76
 Id. at 992.
77 Id. at 993 n.3.
" See id. at 995-96.
79 See id. at 996.
3° See Meiri, 759 F.2d at 996 (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577
(1978)).
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stated that the fact that a non Jew did not replace the plaintiff may
weaken the inference of discrimination.m
In 2000, in Kendrick v. Penske Transportation Services, Inc., where an
employer discharged a black truck driver and subsequently hired two
black drivers, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
held that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case. 82 The court
dispelled the significant amount of confusion that past decisions of
the court may have created in suggesting that a plaintiff needed to
show that the replacement was outside the plaintiff's class. 85 The court
reasoned that the prima fade elements established in McDonnell Doug-
las did not include such a requirement and pointed out that showing
replacement outside the protected class was not the only way to create
an inference of discriminatory discharge.84
Despite its holding that a plaintiff need not show replacement
outside the protected class in the prima facie case, the court stated in
a footnote that the identity of the plaintiff's replacement may still be
relevant.85 In footnote eight, the court noted that a plaintiff may pro-
vide evidence that the employer hired someone outside the protected
class to replace the plaintiff in the plaintiff's prima facie case. 86 Fur-
thermore, according to the court, courts may appropriately consider
evidence concerning the treatment of persons outside the protected
class in the third stage of the evidentiary framework, when the plain-
tiff must prove the employer's proffered reason for discharging the
plaintiff was pre textual. 87
Similarly, in 1997, in Nieto v. L&H Packing Co., the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated that there was no re-
placement requirement in the plaintiff's prima facie case. 88 The iden-
tity of the plaintiff's replacement, however, was material to the ulti-
mate question of discriminatory intent. 89 In this case, the plaintiff was
a Hispanic man who alleged national origin discrimination after the
81 See id.
82 220 F.3d ai 1223, 1224, 1226.
81 See id. at 122611.5.
84 See id. at 1226 n.5, 1229.
na See id. at 1229 n.8.
88 Id.
87 See Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1229 n.8,
88 See 108 F.3d 621, 624 11.7 (5th Cir. 1997).
89 See id.
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defendant discharged him." The employer promoted another His-
panic employee to replace the plaintiff."
The court found that replacement of the plaintiff by another
Hispanic employee, while not outcome determinative, was an impor-
tant factor in deciding whether the defendant discriminatorily dis-
charged the plaintiff.92 The court also found it significant that the de-
fendant employer's workforce was comprised primarily of minor-
ities.93
 The court noted that seventy-two percent of the employer's
new hires were Hispanic and ninety-three percent of recently pro-
moted employees were also Hispanic." Ultimately, the court affirmed
the district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendan
Likewise, in 2000, in Williams v. Trader Publishing Co., the Fifth
Circuit held that the plaintiff in a Title VII case did not need to show
that her employer replaced her with someone outside her protected
class.96
 In this case, the plaintiff was a woman who alleged that her
employer discharged her due to gender discrimination in violation of
Title VII97
 The defendant employer contended that the plaintiff
could not establish a prima facie case because she could not prove
that her employer replaced her with a member of a non-protected
class.98
 The court found that, although replacement with a person
outside the plaintiffs protected class is evidence of discriminatory
intent, it is not essential to the establishment of a prima facie case un-
der Title VII. 99
Three months prior to its decision in Williams, in 2000, in Byers v.
Dallas Morning News, Inc., the Fifth Circuit gave greater weight to re-
placement identity in the case of a white plaintiff alleging reverse race
discrimination.'" In this case, the plaintiff's direct supervisor was a
black man who participated in the decision to terminate the plaintiff,
a white man. 101 After the employer discharged the plaintiff, a white
93
 Id. at 623.
91 Id. at 624.
92 See id.
93 Sec Nieto, 108 F.3d at 623-24.
94 See id. at 624 n.6.
93 Id. at 625.
96 218 F.3d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 2000).
97 Id. at 483.
9a See id. at 485.
99 See id.
ion See 209 F.3d 419, 427 (5th Cir. 2000).
'"' Id. at 422, 423.
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employee assumed most of the plaintiff's job responsibilities.'" Sub-
sequently, another white employee filled the plaintiffs position.'"
The court held that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie
case of race discrimination under Title VII because he failed to meet
the fourth prong of the prima facie case.'" While acknowledging its
holding in Nieto that the plaintiff may establish a prima facie case even
where an employee has been replaced by someone of the same race,
the court emphasized that replacement by someone within one's pro-
tected class is nevertheless relevant to the question of discriminatory
intent. 105
D. Replacement Requirement: Inconsistent with Title VII
In addition to holding that a showing of replacement outside the
protected class is not necessary to establish a prima facie case, many
courts find that such a requirement is at odds with the purpose of Ti-
tle V11. 1 °6 Because Title VII is intended to protect individuals, rather
than classes of individuals, from employment discrimination, requir-
ing a plaintiff to show that the employer has not treated any member
of the plaintiffs class in an unbiased manner misses the crux of Title
VII's purpose.'" In addition, the fact that the employer hires some-
one within the plaintiffs class often leads to the mistaken assumption
that the employer did not discharge the plaintiff with discriminatory
intent.'"
In 1984, in Howard v. Roadway Express, Inc., the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit discussed these possibili-
ties.'" In Howard, the plaintiff was a part-time black employee who
claimed that his application for regular employment was rejected be-
cause of his race.'" The plaintiffs application was rejected in July
1976, he filed a charge with the Equal Employment. Opportunity
102 Ed.
109 Id.
104 Id. at 426-27.
1a5 See Byers, 209 F.3d at 427.
108 See, e.g., Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., Inc., 191 F.3d 344, 355 (3d Cir. 1999); Cumpi-
ano v. Banco Santander P.R., 902 F.2d 148, 156 (1st Cir. 1990); Howard, 726 F.2d at 1536.
107 See Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157, 158 (7th Cir. 1996); Howard, 726
F.2d at 1536.
108 Sec Carson, 82 F.3d at 158; Williams v. Ford Motor Co., 14 F.3d 1305, 1308 (8th Cir.
1994); Howard, 726 F.2d at 1535.
1°9 See 726 F.2d at 1535.
110 Id. at 1530, 1531.
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Commission ("EEOC") in December 1976, and the employer hired
another black person for regular employment in June 1977. 111
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Geor-
gia granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, stating
that precedent had established "that there [could] be no racial dis-
crimination against a black person who [was] not selected for a job
when the person who [was] selected for the job [was] black."'" Thus,
the court found that the plaintiff could not make out a prima facie
case because the plaintiff's replacement was black. 113
In reversing the district court's decision, the Eleventh Circuit
held that the fact that the defendant employer hired someone within
the plaintiff's protected class did not prevent the plaintiff from creat-
ing an inference of discrimination.'" The court stated that the fact
that the employer hired the second employee eleven months after it
rejected the plaintiffs application diminished the reliability of the
second hiring as an indicator of the employer's intent when it re-
jected the plaintiff. 115
 The court also pointed out that, because the
employer hired a black person after the plaintiff filed his charge with
the EEOC, the second hiring by the employer could have been an at-
tempt to disguise an act of discrimination. 116
 Finally, the court con-
'eluded that Title VII's purpose was to guarantee individuals, rather
than groups or classes, equal employment opportunity. 117
Similarly, in 1999, in Pivirotto v. Innovative Systems, Inc., the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that a plaintiff al-
leging discriminatory discharge need not prove that she was replaced
by someone outside her protected class to establish a prima facie
m Id. at 1530-31,
112 Id. at 1534.
IL! See id.
114 See Howard, 726 F.2d at 1534.
115 Sec id. at 1535.
"See id.
117 Id. at 1536. Here, the court applied the reasoning of the United States Supreme
Court in 1982 in Connecticut v. Tea4 a disparate impact case in which the Court "struck
down a racially discriminatory promotion examination notwithstanding the fact that the
ultimate result of the promotional process was an appropriate racial balance." See id. In
Teal, the Court stated that the principal focus of Title VII was "the protection of the indi-
vidual employee, rather than the protection of the minority group as a whole." See 457 U.S.
440, 453-54 (1982). The Supreme Court stated that an employer may not discriminate
against specific employees with impunity merely because it favorably treated other mem-
bers in the same protected class as the employees. See Howard, 726 F.2d at 1536 (citing Teal,
457 U.S. at 455).
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case. 118 In this case, the plaintiff's employer fired her but did not im-
mediately replace her." 9 Instead, a male employee assumed her re-
sponsibilities.'" The court reasoned that the original fourth require-
ment in the hiring context laid out in McDonnell Douglas was not that
the plaintiff show that the employer hired someone outside the plain-
tiff's protected class but rather that the employer continued to seek
applicants for the position."' The court also made reference to foot-
note thirteen of McDonnell Douglas, which stated that because the facts
vary in each Title VII case, the prima facie elements set out will not
necessarily be applicable to every case. 122
In addition, the court focused on the Supreme Court's explica-
tion of the purpose of the prima facie case in Title VII employment
discrimination cases. 1 " One main purpose of the prima facie case,
according to the Third Circuit, is "to eliminate the most obvious, law-
ful reasons for the defendant's action. "124 Requiring a plaintiff to
show the employer replaced the plaintiff with someone outside the
plaintiffs protected class, however, does not eliminate any lawful rea-
son why the employer may have discharged the plaintiff: 126 The court
further stated that even if a plaintiff were replaced by someone within
the plaintiff's class, this fact alone would not necessarily eliminate the
possibility that the employer discriminated against the plaintiff.t 26
To further bolster its holding that the replacement requirement
was inconsistent with Title VII, the court listed a series of circum-
stances in which an employer may have replaced the plaintiff with
someone within the plaintiff's protected class but may have neverthe-
less discriminated against the plaintiff in discharging the plaintiff. 127
One such situation is when an employer sets a higher standard for
employees who belong to a certain class than for those who are out-
side of the protected class. 128
118 See 191 F.3d at 347.
115 Id. at 349.
12o Id.
121 See id. at 352.
122 See id.
123 See Pivirotto, 191 F.3d at 352-53.
124 Id. at 352. Examples of lawful reasons include that the employer did not fill the po-
sition that an applicant sought for economic reasons, the applicant was not qualified, or
the employer did not actually take any adverse action, such as failure to hire or termina-
tion. See id.
125 See id. at 353.
126 See id.
127 See id. at 353-54.
128 See Pivirotto, 191 F.3d at 353.
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An example of a situation where such a double standard is used
to discriminate on the basis of gender is when an employer discharges
a woman when she makes a few mistakes but retains a man who makes
a greater number of errors. 129
 The employer may replace the fired
woman with another woman he hopes will meet his higher standard
for female employees.'" If a court were to dismiss the plaintiff's case
because she could not show that she was replaced by a man, such a
plaintiff with a meritorious claim would not be able to have her day in
court. 131
A second example that the court posited is where the employer
maintains particular, stereotypical expectations of women.'" Thus,
the employer may fire a female employee who does not behave in a
feminine, passive, or delicate manner and replace her with someone
who it believes more aptly fits its description of an ideal female em-
ployee.'" This employer could also escape judgment for its discrimi-
natory double standard in a court that strictly applies the replacement
requirement."4
For example, in 1996, in Carson v. Bethlehem Steel colp., the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit provided an illustra-
tion of a situation in which the replacement requirement would
wrongly weed out a case against an employer who discharged the
plaintiff with discriminatory intent. 135
 The court stated:
Suppose an employer evaluates its staff yearly and retains
black workers who are in the top quarter of its labor force,
but keeps any white in the top half. A black employee ranked
in the 60th percentile of the staff according to supervisors'
evaluations is let go, while all white employees similarly situ-
ated are retained. This is race discrimination, which the em-
ployer cannot purge by hiring another person of the same
race later.'"
129 See id. at 353-54.
130 See id. at 354.
131 See id.
132 See id. at 354.
133
 See Pivirotto, 191 F.3d at 354.
154 See id.
133 See 82 F.3d at 158.
133 Id.
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Because the possibility of such discrimination exists, the court con-
chided that the replacement requirement is neither sufficient nor
necessary to establish an inference of dikrimination. 157
The court emphasized that the central inquiry in a discrimina-
tory discharge case was "whether the employer would have taken the
same action had the employee been of a different race (age, sex, re-
ligion, national origin, etc.) and everything else had remained the
same." As the court illustrated in the above example, whether the
employer subsequently hired another person who belongs to the
plaintiff's protected class after discharging the plaintiff is not. helpful
in determining whether the employer had discriminatory motives
when terminating the plaintiff's employment." 9
In 1999, in Perry v. Woodward, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit provided further examples of allegations of
wrongfully motivated discharges that would be dismissed if a court
applied the replacement requirement.'" The court hypothesized that
an employer may "hire and fire minority employees in an attempt to
prevent them from vesting in employment benefits or developing a
track record to qualify for promotion."141 In addition, an employer
may prefer demure women to those it perceives as "feminist" or it may
hire a black employee whom it perceives "know[s] his place" to re-
place another black employee who is less willing to cooperate with the
employer's stereotypical ideals. 142
The facts of Perry give an example of a plaintiff with a meritorious
claim who would be precluded from establishing a prima facie case if
the replacement requirement were imposed.'" The plaintiff who al-
leged race discrimination was a Hispanic employee whom the em-
ployer replaced with another Hispanic person.'" Despite the fact that
the defendant employer hired another Hispanic person, the record
was rife with examples of racist remarks made by the plaintiff's super-
visor.'" During one staff meeting, the supervisor allegedly announced
that Hispanics needed more education. 146 In addition, the supervisor
157 See id. at 158-59.
138 Sec id. at 158.
139 See id. at 159.
140 See 199 F.36 1126,1137 (10th Cir. 1999).
141 See id.
142 See id.
145 See id. at 1130-31.
'" Id. at 1131,1140.
145 See Perry, 199 F.36 at 1130-31.
146 Id. at 1130.
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called another employee a "dirty Mexican," commented on the bad
odor of Mexicans, and threatened to make the Hispanic employees
"so miserable, that they will leave, one at a time: 147 Filially, the super-
visor admitted to another employee that he did not like Hispanics be-
cause they were "hot blooded and [her] ex-husband left [her] for a
hot blooded Mexican."148
Finally, the court disagreed with courts that require a plaintiff
who fails to satisfy the replacement requirement to come forward with
additional evidence that would counteract this failure, or provide the
same inference of discrimination that a showing of replacement out-
side the protected class would create. 149 The court reasoned that
courts which have required this showing have not given any examples
of evidence that would be sufficient to give rise to such an inference
and this vague requirement is too nebulous for courts to apply.'"
In 1990, in Cumpiano v. Banco Santander Puerto Rico, in holding
that a plaintiff alleging discriminatory termination based on her
pregnancy did not need to show that she was replaced by a non-
pregnant person, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit gave another reason why a replacement requirement is inappro-
priate for discriminatory discharge cases. 181 The court noted that ex-
amining an employer's history or track record of hires or discharges
was important when attempting to ascertain whether a pattern of dis-
crimination has developed. 182 This pattern is a crucial element of
proof in a disparate impact case where the plaintiff's duty is to show
that, despite a facially neutral employment policy, the impact of the
policy unfavorably affects members of a protected class.'" In a dispa-
rate treatment case, however, the focus is on how a defendant em-
ployer treated a specific employee.'" Thus, the court echoed the con-
clusion of the Eleventh Circuit in Howard that the purpose of Title VII
as applied to discriminatory discharge cases was to protect individuals,
not groups, from discrimination . 155
147 Id. at 1130, 1131.
145 Id. at 1131.
149 See id. at 1139.
'" See Perry, 199 F.3d at 1139.
151 See 902 F.2d at 156.
152
 See id.
153 Sec id.
154 See id.
155 See id.; Howard, 726 F.2d at 1536.
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III. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S TREATMENT OF THE
REPLACEMENT REQUIREMENT
The United States Supreme Court has never directly addressed
the question of whether a Title VII plaintiff must show that the de-
fendant employer hired someone outside the plaintiff's protected
class to replace the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case. 158 Never-
theless, federal appellate courts have applied two Supreme Court
cases to Title VII discharge cases. 157
In 1993, in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, the United States Su-
preme Court considered a disparate treatment case where an em-
ployer discharged a black correctional officer and replaced him with a
white person. 158 In this case, the employer's asserted reason for dis-
charging the plaintiff was at issue. 159 When setting out the prima facie.
case from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the Court accepted the dis-
trict court's finding that the fourth element had been satisfied be-
cause the plaintiff's position remained open and the defendant ulti-
mately filled the position with a white man. 150
Some lower courts have used the Hicks opinion to support the
principle that a plaintiff must show that a person outside the plain-
tiff's protected class replaced the plaintiff. 151 Justice David Sower,
however, in his dissent, pointed out in a footnote that, although the
majority opinion mentioned that the plaintiff was replaced by some-
one outside his class, the issue of whether a plaintiff must show such a
replacement was not before the Court and that it has never directly
addressed the materiality of the identity of the plaintiff's replacement
in a Title VII case. 182
Three years after Hicks, in O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers
Corp., the Supreme Court held that in age discrimination cases
brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"),
whether the employer replaced the plaintiff with someone outside the
156 See St. Mary's Honor Cm v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 527 n.1 (1993).
'57 See, e.g., Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., Inc., 191 F.3d 344, 353 (3d Cir. 1999); Brown v.
McLean, 159 F.3d 898, 905 (4th Cir. 1998); Simens v. Reno, 960 F. Supp. 6, 8-9 (D,D.C.
1997). The first Supreme Court case mentioned a Title VII plaintiff's replacement and the
second case dealt with the replacement requirement in an age discrimination context. See
O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311-13 (1996); Hicks, 509 U.S. at
506.
' 55 509 U.S. at 504, 506.
159 Id. at 509.
160 See id. at 506.
161 See, e.g., Brown, 159 F.3d at 905.
162 Hicks, 509 U.S. at 528 n.1.
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protected class was not a proper element of the prima facie case.'" In
O'Connor, the plaintiff was fifty-six years old and, after firing him, the
employer replaced him with a forty year-old person.' The Court
stated that there must be some "logical connection between each
element of the prima facie case and the illegal discrimination for
which it establishes a 'legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption,'" 165
Therefore, the Court held that because the fact that a plaintiff was
replaced by someone who is also forty or over lacks probative value, it
is not an appropriate element in the prima facie case. 168
The Court emphasized that whether someone who was in the
plaintiff's protected class replaced the plaintiff was irrelevant because
the ADEA prohibited discrimination due to an employee's age rather
than due to the employee being within the protected class of persons
aged forty and over. 167 The more reliable indicator of age discrimina-
tion was whether the plaintiff's replacement was "substantially
younger" than the plaintiff: 168
Lower courts have disagreed about whether the O'Connor holding
is applicable to the Title VII context. 169 In Simms v. Reno, the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia found, in 199'7, that
the O'Connor holding was not transferable to a Title VII sex discrimi-
nation case.'" In this case, the defendant employer did not select the
female plaintiff for a position, but rather employed another
woman."' The district court asserted that the O'Connor opinion itself
stated that its holding did not apply to Title VII cases by emphasizing
that a discrimination inquiry under the ADEA does not focus on the
plaintiffs membership in a protected class. 172 The district court
pointed out that the Supreme Court found significant the degree of
age disparity between the plaintiff and plaintiff's replacement.'" The
characteristics included in Title VII, such as race and gender, are dis-
163 See 517 U.S. at 313.
It See id. at 309, 310.
165 See id. at 311-12 (quoting Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 950 U.S. 248, 254
n.7 (1981)).
168 See id. at 312.
167
 See id.
168 O'Connor, 517 U.S. at 313.
169 See, e.g., Stella v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 135, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Carson v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157, 158 (7th Cir. 1996); Simens, 960 F. Supp. at 8.
' 7° Sce960 F. Supp. at 8.
171 Id. at 7-8.
172 See id. at 8.
173
 Sec id. at 9.
2003}	 Title VII Plaintiffs Replacement 	 1315
crete immutable traits with no levels or degrees of which to speak. 174
Therefore, a court may easily determine whether a plaintiff has cre-
ated an inference of discrimination simply based on whether the
plaintiff's replacement was within the protected class." 5 The district
court also stated that the Supreme Court focused on whether the
prima fade element had any probative value in the discrimination
determination.'" Because class membership was not probative in the
ADEA context but was probative in the Title WI context, the O'Connor
holding was not relevant in a Tide VII case. 177
In Pivirotto u Innovative Systems, Inc., the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit disagreed. 178 The court held that a fe-
male plaintiff alleging sex discrimination need not show that a man
replaced her. 179 The court based its holding partly on the Supreme
Court's reasoning in O'Connor. 194 While acknowledging that the fact
that a man replaced a female employee may have more probative
value than the requirement in an age discrimination context, the
court asserted that the Supreme Court's reasoning was equally appli-
cable in the gender discrimination context.lim Just as the fact that
someone within the protected class replaced the plaintiff in an age
discrimination suit was irrelevant to the prima facie case as long as the
plaintiff was discharged on the basis of age, the fact that someone
within the protected class replaced a Title VU plaintiff was also irrele-
vant if the employer discriminated against her on the basis of her
membership in the class. 182 Finally, the court pointed out that the
main thrust of the Supreme Court's reasoning in O'Connor—that the
proper focus in determining whether the plaintiff has made out a
prima facie case for discrimination was determining whether she has
created an inference of discrimination—was equally applicable in the
Title VII context. 195
174
 See id.
175 Sec SitPiellS, 960 F. Supp. at 9.
175 See id.
177
 See id.
17a See 191 F.3d at 354-55.
179
 See id. at 354.
le° See id. at 354-55.
181 See id. at 355.
182
 See id.
183 See Pivimtto, 191 F.3d at 355.
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W. ANALYSIS: THE IDENTITY OF PLAINTIFF'S REPLACEMENT IS NOT A
VALID CONSIDERATION AT ANY POINT IN THE EVIDENTIARY
FRAMEWORK
The primary focus of the disagreements among the federal cir-
cuit courts of appeals regarding the identity of a discharged Title VII
plaintiff's replacement has been its role in the prima facie case. 184 A
minority of the federal circuit courts of appeals require that the plain-
tiff show replacement by someone outside the plaintiff's protected
class to establish a prima facie case for discriminatory discharge.'"
Other federal circuit courts of appeals do not strictly require the
showing but consider replacement identity in the prima facie case or
in the third step of the evidentiary framework.'" Many federal circuit
courts of appeals have held that the replacement requirement is not
an appropriate consideration in the Title VII plaintiff's prima facie
case. 187
Currently, a majority of the federal circuit courts of appeals agree
that the replacement requirement has no place in the plaintiff's
prima facie case.'" Some of these courts have stated that the identity
of the plaintiff's replacement may be a factor in the ultimate inquiry
of discriminatory intent.'" Many of the courts' reasons for eliminat-
ing the replacement requirement in the prima facie case, however,
additionally support the argument that the replacement requirement
also should not be a consideration in the third step of the evidentiary
framework, where the plaintiff must show that the employer's stated
reason is merely a pretext for its discriminatory motive.'"
A. Replacetnent Identity's Lack of Probative Value Is More Relevant in
Plaintiffs Ultimate Burden
Although the controversy surrounding the consideration of re-
placement identity centers on its role in the prima facie case, it is not
until the third step of the evidentiary framework that courts test its
probative value, or the lack thereof. 191 Although many federal circuit
um See supra notes 32-155 and accompanying text.
188 See supra notes 36-51 and accompanying text.
'no See supra notes 52-105 and accompanying text.
187 See supra notes 106-155 and accompanying text.
10
 See supra notes 106-155 and accompanying text.
' 88 See, e.g.. Nieto v. L&H Packing Co., 108 F.3d 621,624 n.7 (5th Cir. 1997).
ig° See supra notes 106-155 and accompanying text.
191 See Chin & Golinsky, supra note 27, at 660.
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courts of appeals decisions properly interpret the elements of a prima
facie case or the functioning of the burden-shifting framework, the
ultimate issue in an employment discrimination case is the same:
whether the plaintiff has proven that it is more likely than not that the
discharge was motivated at least in part by an impermissible reason. 192
Precisely because a Title VII plaintiff often does not have direct
evidence of an employer's discriminatory motive, the United States
Supreme Court emphasized that a prima facie burden is not intended
to be onerous.'" Most plaintiffs are able to meet the four elements of
the McDonnell Douglas Goip. v. Green prima facie case and as a result,
the Title VII prima facie case "has evolved into something of a formal-
ity. In fact, many courts simply presume that the plaintiff has made
out a prima facie case." In addition, as long as the employer offers a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge, it meets its
burden in the second step of the evidentiary framework. 195 Thus, the
defendant's burden also appears to be a mere formality that few, if
any, defendants are unable to meet. 196
As a result, substantive determinations of Title VII violations oc-
cur not during the plaintiffs prima facie case or the defendant's ar-
ticulation of a legitimate reason for its actions, but rather when the
court is deciding whether the plaintiff has met the ultimate burden of
persuasion.I 97 For this reason, courts may not weigh the probative
value of replacement identity until the third step of the evidentiary.
framework." Thus, the misleading effects of considering the identity
of the plaintiffs replacement has the greatest force during the ulti-
mate inquiry phase and should therefore be eliminated from consid-
eration from the entire evidentiary framework, rather than merely in
the prima facie case. 199
192
 See id.
199 See Jones v. W. Geophysical Co. of Am., 669 F.2d 280, 284 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing
Tex. Dept of Cmiy. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)).
194 See Chin & Golinsky, supra note 27, at 668.
199
 See id. at 665.
199 See id.
197
 See id. at 671.
199
 See id.
199 See Chin & Golinsky, supra note 27, at 671.
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B. Reasons for Exduding Replacement Identity from Prima Facie Case
Support Exclusion of Consideration from Plaintiff's Entire Case
A summary of the reasons that the federal circuit courts of ap-
peals have presented in eliminating the replacement requirement as
an element of the prima fade case reveals that the requirement would
be equally misleading in the ultimate determination of whether the
employer had discriminatory intent when discharging the plaintiff. 200
First, the replacement requirement is inappropriate and at odds with
the policies underlying Title VII. 20
 Title VII protects persons, not
classes of persons, and therefore a requirement that the plaintiff show
that she was replaced by a person outside of her protected class does
not comport with Title VII's purpose, because it presumes that the
employer has not discriminated against the plaintiff if it has subse-
quently hired another member of the plaintiff's protected class. 202
Furthermore, the replacement requirement is often unworkable
because of the difficulty of identifying the precise protected class of
which the plaintiff is a member. 203 If the plaintiff's identity encom-
passes multiple categories of protection (such as a Hispanic woman)
or a particular subcategory of a specific class (such as an Orthodox
Jew or a mixed-race individual), determining the degree of narrow-
ness or breadth in identifying the appropriate protected class be-
comes particularly challenging. 204
Even if a court has determined the accurate and relevant pro-
tected class for the plaintiff, assuming that members of one protected
class are fungible or interchangeable in the employment context is
fraught with dangers, because each member of a protected class is a
unique and complex individual, 205 As a result, the employer's decision
to discharge the plaintiff may still be based on an improper discrimi-
natory motive even if the employer hired someone in the plaintiffs
protected class to replace the plaintiff. 20 For example, if the em-
ployer fires employees who do not fit its description of stereotypical
200 See supra notes 106-155 and accompanying text.
211 See Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., Inc., 191 F.3d 344, 355 (3d Cir. 1999); Cumpiano v.
Banco Santander P.R., 902 F.2d 148, 156 (1st Cir. 1990); Meiri v Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 995-
96 (2d Cir. 1985).
202 See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 453-54 (1982); Howard v. Roadway Express,
Inc., 726 F.2d 1529, 1536 (11th Cir. 1984).
203
 See Meiri, 759 F.2d at 996.
204
 See id.
202 See Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1137 (10th Cir. 1999); Pivirotto, 191 F.3d at
354.
206 See Perry, 199 F.3d at 1137; Pivirotto, 191 F.3d at 354.
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minorities or gender roles and replaces them with members of the
same protected class who do, the employer has nevertheless violated
Title VII.207 For this reason, examining an employer's track record of
hiring and discharging, as well as statistics of employee characteristics
over time, is more appropriate in disparate impact cases, where the
plaintiff seeks to establish a pattern of discrimination by the em-
ployer. 208 In contrast, the inquiry in discriminatory treatment cases is
whether the employer has discriminated against the plaintiff as an
individual, rather than against members of the plaintiff's protected
class general ly.2°9
Additional possible employer motives demonstrate why consider-
ing the identity of the plaintiff's replacement may be misleading in
determining discriminatory intent.210 If the employer replaced the
plaintiff after the plaintiff filed a Title VII complaint, the employer
may have chosen to hire a person in the plaintiff's protected class to
disguise its previous act of discrimination. 2 " Alternatively, the em-
ployer may hire an employee, discharge the employee before the em-
ployee's employment benefits have vested or before the employee is
eligible for a promotion, and subsequently hire a replacement within
the employee's protected class in order to prevent minority employees
from achieving management leve1. 2 " In this circumstance, the em-
ployer discriminated against the plaintiff on an impermissible basis,
but considering the identity of the plaintiff's replacement would
weaken or negate the plaintiff's attempt to show discriminatory in-
tent.2"
In addition, consideration of replacement identity has the poten-
tial to be a red herring in Title VII cases when the employer imposes a
higher standard for members of the plaintiffs protected class that it
does not apply to its employees who do not belong to the class. 214
Thus, the employer may discharge members of the protected class
who do not meet this higher standard and hire replacement employ-
207 See Perry, 199 F.3d at 1137; Pivirotto, 191 F.3d at 354.
208 See Cumpiano, 902 F.2d at 156. But see Sengupta v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 804 F.2d
1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986).
209 See Cumpiano, 902 F.2d at 156.
21° See Perry, 199 F.3d at 1137; Brown v. McLean, 159 F.3(1 898, 905-06 (4th Cir. 1998);
Howard, 726 F.2d at 1535.
211 See Brown, 159 F.3d at 905-06; Howard, 726 F.2d at 1535.
210 Sec Perry, 199 F.3d at 1137.
213 See id.
211 See Pivirotto, 191 F.3d at 353; Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157, 158 (7th
Cir. 1996).
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ees of the same protected class who do.215
 Also, if significant time has
passed between the plaintiffs discharge and the employer's replace-
ment of the plaintiff, the utility of considering replacement identity as
an indication of the presence or absence of discriminatory intent
proves to be even more remote because the employer may have re-
placed supervisors or managers who have the power to terminate. 216
Finally, the United States Supreme Court's reasoning in 1996 in
O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp. not only applies to Title VII
cases but also serves to support the elimination of replacement iden-
tity as a consideration in the third step of the evidentiary framework
of Title VII cases 2 17 The Court found that whether someone outside
the class of people age forty or over replaced the ADEA plaintiff lacks
probative value in an age discrimination case. 218 Similarly, in the Title
VII context, the fact that the employer replaced the plaintiff with
someone within the plaintiff's protected class is irrelevant as long as
the employer discharged the plaintiff on the basis of the plaintiff's
membership in the class."' Given the many circumstances in which an
employer may discriminate in violation of Title VII when discharging
an employee, despite the fact that it replaces the employee with
someone in the same protected class, replacement identity lacks pro-
bative value not only in the prima facie case but also in the plaintiff's
ultimate burden of persuasion. 220
Furthermore, the argument that the Supreme Court's reasoning
in O'Connor is not applicable in the Title VII context because of the
difference in nature between age and Title VII's protected classes is
flawed.221
 Although one's racial and gender traits are immutable over
the course of one's life, whereas one's age is not, just as there are lev-
els and degrees when it comes to age, there are comparable degrees
in racial and gender characteristics. 222 For example, an employer who
discharged an employee who is sixty years of age and replaced her
with someone who is forty-five years of age may nevertheless have en-
gaged in age discrimination because of the level of age disparity be-
tween the two ernployees. 223
 Similarly, an employer who terminates
215 See Pivirotto, 191 F.3d at 353; Carson, 82 F.3d at 158.
216 See Brown, 159 F.3d at 905-06; Howard, 726 F.2d at 1535.
217 See 517 U.S. 308,311-13 (1996); Pivirotlo, 191 F.3d at 355.
218 See O'Connor, 517 U.S. at 312.
219 See Pivirotto, 191 F.3d at 355.
220 See id.
221
 See id.
222 Sce id.
223 See O'Connor, 517 U.S. at 313.
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the employment of a black employee whom the employer perceives as
insufficiently subservient and replaces him with another black person
whom the employer perceives as someone who "knows his place" as a
black individual may also have engaged in race discrimination, de-
spite the fact that both employees are black. 224
C. Distinctions Based on Protected Class Are Artificial and Irrelevant
By allowing consideration of the identity of the plaintiff's re-
placement in a discriminatory discharge case, courts place artificial
boundaries between Title VII protected classes that lead to inaccurate
and unjust rulings.225
 In contrast to disparate impact cases, in the dis-
parate treatment framework, a protected class formulation is inap-
propriate and irrelevant because the focus is on whether the em-
ployer unlawfully discriminated against the plaintiff based on the
plaintiffs membership in a protected class, rather than whether the
employer discriminated against a class of persons. 226
Due to the complexity of employer motivations and perceptions
of identity, a rigid categorization of the protected class in the Tide VII
disparate treatment context is impractical. 227 An employer may prefer
to employ an employee from another country who does not speak
with an accent to one who does, or it may discriminate on the basis of
the shade of skin color within the same racial categor y.228 Because of
the multiple overlapping characteristics within classifications, any
consideration of the protected class to which the plaintiffs replace-
ment belongs in determining discriminatory treatment, whether in
the prima facie case, or in the plaintiffs ultimate burden of persua-
sion, perpetuates racial and gender stereotypes and further muddies
the already murky waters of employment discrimination. 229
CONCLUSION
The identity of the plaintiff's replacement in a discriminatory
discharge suit should not be a consideration at any point in the Title
VII evidentiary framework. The underlying policy of Title VII is to
2Y 4 See Perry, 199 F.3d at 1137.
225 See e. christi cunningham, The Rise of Identity Politics I: The Myth of the Protected Class in
Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 30 CONN. L. REV. 441, 442-43 (1998).
226 See id. at 449.
222 See id. at 478.
228 See id. at 478-79.
229 See id.
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protect individuals, not classes of individuals, from employment dis-
crimination. Furthermore, whether an employer hired a person
within the plaintiff's protected class to replace the plaintiff is not an
accurate indicator of the presence or absence of discriminatory in-
tent. In addition, the difficulty of identifying the relevant protected
class further supports the contention that replacement identity lacks
probative value in a Title VII case. Therefore, consideration of the
plaintiffs replacement in a discriminatory discharge suit has no le-
gitimate place in either the plaintiffs prima facie case or the plain-
tiffs ultimate burden of persuasion.
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